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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of end-end se-
curity enhancement by resorting to deliberate noise injected in
ciphertexts. The main goal is to generate a degraded wiretap
channel in application layer over which Wyner-type secrecy en-
coding is invoked to deliver additional secure information. More
specifically, we study secrecy enhancement of DES block cipher
working in cipher feedback model (CFB) when adjustable and
intentional noise is introduced into encrypted data in application
layer. A verification strategy in exhaustive search step of linear
attack is designed to allow Eve to mount a successful attack
in the noisy environment. Thus, a controllable wiretap channel
is created over multiple frames by taking advantage of errors
in Eve’s cryptanalysis, whose secrecy capacity is found for the
case of known channel states at receivers. As a result, additional
secure information can be delivered by performing Wyner type
secrecy encoding over super-frames ahead of encryption, namely,
our proposed secrecy encoding-then-encryption scheme. These
secrecy bits could be taken as symmetric keys for upcoming
frames. Numerical results indicate that a sufficiently large secrecy
rate can be achieved by selective noise addition.
Index Terms—DES cipher, CFB mode, deliberate noise, linear
cryptanalysis, Markov chain, wiretap channel, secrecy capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, end-end secrecy delivery relies on symmetric
or asymmetric encryption residing in the upper layer of a com-
munication system, as well as sophisticated key management
schemes [1], [2]. Without requiring a secure cipher, Wyner-
type secrecy encoding provides a completely different solu-
tion to link-wise secret message delivery by random binning
tailored to some presumed wiretap channel models in physical
layer [3], [4]. In this paper, we propose an encoding-encryption
approach to end-end secrecy delivery by encoding over a
degraded wiretap channel across super-frames transmitted in
the application layer. The resulting wiretap channel is created
by injecting controllable noise into ciphertext after encryption,
and determined by both the adversary node’s uncertainty
about the key of cipher and its limited resources in launching
cryptanalysis. Secrete information transmitted in such manner
could be taken as keys for the subsequent super-frame.
In the proposed framework, we are essentially exploring
the techniques developed for physical layer secrecy encoding
and cryptanalysis against symmetric block ciphers to serve
our purpose of realizing end-end secrecy enhancement without
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resorting to exogenous physical channel conditions. More
specifically, Data Encryption Standard (DES) block cipher
working in Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) is taken to encrypt
messages encoded using the Wyner type secrecy encoding
scheme and then transmitted over multiple frames encrypted
using different keys. Random binary noise is then deliberately
added onto ciphertext, which are received by both legitimate
user and an eavesdropper without any additional distortion.
Such a hierarchical encoding-encryption framework allows
us to transmit secrete messages over the resulting degraded
wiretap channels in the application layer without making any
assumption regarding end-end physical channel conditions.
In order to analyze secrecy enhancement achieved by utiliz-
ing our encoding-then-encryption approach, we need to study
how Eve responds to the existing noise in her gathered data,
and how that influences her cryptanalysis performance. In our
case, Eve attempts to mount her linear attack with accumulated
noisy ciphertexts, and thus applies a new verification strategy
in the second phase of the linear attack while considering her
possible resource constraints. Our statistical analysis shows
that even when she uses a numerically optimized attacking
strategy to obtain the key, it is likely for her to make mistakes
in cryptanalysis. These possible failures of Eve over multiple
frames make her channel degraded than the main channel,
which can be further exploited by secrecy encoder to send
additional secret bits over a super-frame. Therefore we could
utilize generated secret bits over the last super-frame, whose
secrecy is ensured by Wyner-type secrecy encoding scheme, to
establish keys for next coming frames. The secrecy capacity of
the system is computed assuming known channel states at Bob
and Eve. Numerical results illustrate how deliberately added
noise influences secrecy rate which can be further maximized
at certain noise rate. It should be noted that the primary goal
of our paper is to demonstrate through such a case-study
how secrecy encoding and symmetric encryption could be
put together to enhance end-end security, and thus we only
provide capacity computation of the resulting channel towards
the end without dealing with the implementation of a particular
secrecy encoder [5].
In literature, very few analytical approaches have focused on
the impact of noisy ciphertexts on the attacking performance.
In [6] different security schemes are analyzed from both
reliability and secrecy perspectives in the presence of channel
noise; nonetheless, they do not discuss what modified strategy
Eve needs to take adaptively against degradation, and nor
have they considered further leveraging adversary’s failures
in its cryptanalysis. In fact, our approach shares a common
spirit with friendly jamming schemes proposed in physical
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2layer secrecy encoding [7], [8] where deliberate noise is in-
troduced in physical layer to interfere both legitimate link and
eavesdropped link to improve the secrecy rate region. Unlike
these works where link-wise physical channel features are
explored to create a degraded wiretap channel, we essentially
explore the adversary’s disadvantages due to its uncertainty
about the secrete key bits and resulting deteriorated success
rate in cryptanalysis in the presence of deliberate noise.
In addition, deliberate additive noise in encryption process
was used to improve security of ciphers in previous works [9],
[10], [11]. The primary goals in these works were to enhance
the secrecy of a cipher by random binning and additive
noise, not the one we are interested in, namely, deploying
encoding-then-encryption framework to enhance secrecy by
further encoding over a resulting degraded wiretap channel.
Random measurement noise has also been considered in side
channel attacks (SCA) where information about cryptographic
operation is leaked through some physical measurements con-
ducted by an adversary [12]. In [13], authors proposed to use
multi-linear approximation utilized in Differential Power Anal-
ysis (DPA)-like attacks, which is powerful due its robustness
against noise, to attack a symmetric cipher hardware by power
analysis
The paper is organized as follows. In sections II, a pre-
liminary description of CFB mode and linear cryptanalysis
is provided. In section III the proposed security scheme
is described in detail, and in IV, we design an optimized
verification strategy for Eve. In section V the main channel and
wire-tap channel are modeled and then the secrecy capacity of
the resulting degraded wiretap channel is found in section VI.
Finally, we present the numerical results in section VII and
conclude the work in section VIII.
II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Properties of CFB Mode of Operation with DES Cipher
DES is a symmetric key encryption cipher which has
plaintexts and ciphertext of size 64-bit with the key length of
56 bit. Although DES is replaced by AES in some applications,
it is still used and studied in many networks [14] and [15].
CFB mode is one of the operational modes that can be used
to derive a key stream from block ciphers like DES [16]. We
assume that block size in CFB mode is 64-bit. As can be seen
in Fig. 1, at time n, encryption of previous ciphertext block
Cn−1 generates the key stream Sn which Xors with the the
current 64-bit plaintext Pn, to generate 64-bit ciphertext block
Cn, i.e. Cn = Sn ⊕ Pn where Sn = EK(Cn−1).
DES encryption is very sensitive to the noise introduced into
ciphertexts or key bits. In particular, when one bit of the key or
the input to the cipher is altered, it can deteriorate about half
of the cipher output. This property is called avalanche effect
[17]. However, since S-boxes in DES cipher are not ideal,
the resulted bit error rate by avalanche effect is not exactly
0.5. This is also true in more advanced ciphers like AES as
discussed in [18]. That is why in our analysis we assume that
when there is an error in cipher input or in the key, each output
bit is flipped with the probability of α.
Fig. 1. Cipher feedback mode (CFB) with DES cipher [6]
B. Linear Cryptanalysis
Linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext attack which was
first proposed by Matsui in [19] to attack DES. It is one of the
most widely used attacks on block ciphers. This cryptanalysis
approach exploits a linear equation with the probability of p 6=
1
2 which involves some input and output bits of the DES cipher
and some key bits. The quantity ε = |p− 12 |, which is called
bias, measures the correlation among plaintext, ciphertext and
the key bits, and can be used as a criterion to distinguish the
right key. Before attack, Eve has to gather a large number
of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, and then for each possible key
value compute its corresponding bias by counting the number
of pairs that satisfy the linear equation.
If we refer to m as the number of attacked key bits in
linear cryptanalysis, the number of subkey candidates would
be 2m that need to be sorted from rank 1 to 2m based on
their corresponding probability biases. It should be noted that
it is not necessarily always true that the right key ranks the
highest, but it will be surely among high ranked candidates.
Assume that adversary only checks top 2m−a candidates
during exhaustive search, and since each subkey candidate gets
checked with all possible combinations of 56−m remaining
unattacked bits, Eve has to run exhaustive search with at most
256−m encryptions for each candidate. As a result, the total
number of 56 key bits examined in linear attack with bit
advantage a is 256−a. In [20], A. Selc¸uk showed that when
the total number of gathered plaintext/ciphertext pairs N are
large enough, the probability of success Ps, defined as the
probability that the right key is among 256−a top candidates,
can be derived as
Ps = Φ(2
√
Nε− Φ−1(1− 2−a−1)), (1)
where a is the bit advantage of the attack, ε is the bias of the
used linear approximation and Φ is the cumulative distribution
function of the standardized normal distribution.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME FOR SECURITY SYSTEM
Fig. 2 illustrates the proposed scheme for secrecy improve-
ment in which after encryption of the original message S,
intentional noise is injected into it to generate a degraded wire-
tap channel. Since we consider end to end secrecy, physical
channel is assumed to be error-free. Therefore, the ciphertexts
that Bob obtains only include errors caused by intentional
noise introduced into encrypted data in application layer with
bit error rate of η. Moreover, because Alice and Bob agree
on the key used for the current data frame, Bob can decrypt
the obtained noisy ciphertexts and then apply the wiretap
3channel decoding algorithm that allows him to recover the
original message Sˆ with arbitrarily small error probability. As
indicated in Fig. 2, there exists an oracle which is located
after encryption and noise injection, whereby Eve can query
and obtain consecutive plaintext/ciphertext pairs. However, due
to the deliberate noise, the virtual oracle provides Eve with
noisy ciphertexts distorted by a binary noise sequence with
independent errors of rate η. The main advantage that Bob
has over Eve is that Bob and Alice share the same encryption
and decryption key which is unknown to Eve. Therefore, Eve
has to adopt an attack strategy that can exploit the gathered
noisy data in order to guess the secret key.
We assume that legitimate users initialize with a shared set
of keys in a highly secure manner at the beginning. As a result,
Alice can divide the whole data into equal size data frames,
each including M number of data blocks of size 64-bit which
is the block size used in CFB mode. In this way, the same key
will be used for M 64-bit blocks in each frame for encryption
and decryption at the receiver end. In this paper, we show that
due to Eve’s resource constraints, it is likely for her to make
mistakes in assessing a frame key. As a result, Eve’s channel is
a degraded version of the main channel. We can leverage this
advantage by applying Wyner secrecy encoding over super-
frames to average over all possible failures by Eve. In Wyner-
type encoder redundancy is added to correct errors that occur
across the main channel, and randomness is added for keeping
Eve ignorant across the wiretap channel [3], [5]. Note that this
scheme can be generalized for other block ciphers like AES
when they are used in operational modes like CFB or CBC
(Cipher Block chaining).
Another issue is key scheduling problem to provide highly
confidential and distinctive keys for each frame while Bob is
fully aware of them. Here, we can use traditional way of key
management which is sophisticated and costly. For instance,
master/session key scheduling approach which is proposed for
DES cipher in [1], [2]. In this technique, there exists a master
key out of which frame keys as session keys can be originated.
In our scheme, we propose a simpler approach which requires
less expenditure. In this technique the secrecy required for
frame keys is originated from secret bits delivered by Wyner
secrecy encoder over the intentionally created wiretap channel.
As a result, since encoder is performed over each super-frame,
Alice can use input to the encoder to derive frame keys in
next super-frame, for instance by applying a universal class
of Hash functions [21], where the utilized function for each
frame is publicly known. Bob is able to decode encrypted data
and obtain the encoded message, and thus he will be able to
derive keys for next frames. Note that the requirement for this
approach is that there has to exist some root keys to initiate
the keys for the first super-frame.
IV. EVE’S ATTACK STRATEGY AND ITS ANALYSIS IN NOISY
ENVIRONMENT
This section studies the effect of the channel degradation on
the performance of the linear cryptanalysis in terms of Eve’s
success rate. Since linear cryptanalysis is a known plaintext
attack, Eve has to rely on the received plaintext/ciphertexts
Fig. 2. The proposed security scheme based on the intentional noise
pairs. Due to the existing errors in these ciphertexts, when
Eve examines a key, she is unable to distinguish between
errors caused by the received noisy ciphertext and the ones
induced by using the wrong key. Thus, she needs to design a
new verification approach whereby she can find the right key.
It should be noted that this attack strategy with verification
process has to be designed in a way that attack success rate
gets maximized from Eve’s perspective.
A. Designed Verification Strategy for Attack
Consider ciphertexts go through a binary symmetric channel
whose cross-over probability is η. As seen in Fig. 1, after
Cn passes through channel, and Xors with channel noise, the
received noisy 64-bit ciphertext Cˆn will have error with the
probability of 1− (1− η)64. Therefore, Eve can not rely only
on two successive ciphertexts to check the correctness of a
key, because they might have errors that can lead her to make
mistakes. Indeed, Eve has to try a number of successive pairs,
using CFB mode in order to increase her success rate.
In Fig. 3, two consecutive stages of CFB that are used to
check the key are shown, where Pi and Cˆi are respectively the
plaintext and ciphertext for the ith stage, Si is the encrypted
result of Cˆi−1 that after Xor with Pi generates Cˆhi . Provided
that the used key is correct, Cˆhi must be the same as Cˆi.
However, due to the possible errors in Cˆi or Cˆi−1 there might
be some differences between Cˆi and Cˆhi even though the used
key is right. Therefore, Hamming Weight (HW) of Xor of Cˆhi
and the ciphertext Cˆi denoted by Ei must be compared with
a threshold denoted as τ . Then, a key trial for the ith stage
can be considered successful if this HW is less than τ .
Note that at stage i when there is an error either in the input
to the cipher, i.e. Cˆi−1 or in the key, there will be burst of
errors in Si, which makes Cˆhi totally different and in special
case of α = 0.5 independent from Cˆi. Therefore, by choosing
a small value for threshold τ and comparing HW of Cˆhi ⊕ Cˆi,
Eve can know that either input to the cipher or the key is
noisy. In Table I, the key verification strategy for Eve is given
that she needs to follow in the brute-force attack phase of
linear cryptanalysis to test the correctness of the examined
key ki. In this strategy, Eve examines each key candidate Nc
times with Nc consecutive pairs. When at least one of trials is
successful, Eve decides that the key is correct. That is because
for a correct key, Nc is chosen such that she can make sure
that with a high probability at least in one trial out of Nc tests,
input to the cipher has no error that results in a success.
Now the question is how we can choose the optimum value
for τ . When the tested key is right, at stage i, for error-free
4TABLE I
VERIFICATION STRATEGY
1- Pick Nc number of consecutive pairs.
2- Try Nc chosen pairs over Nc chained CFB stages using the key ki.
3- A trial is successful if HW (Ei = Cˆi ⊕ Cˆhi ) ≤ τ .
4- If there exists at least one successful event out of Nc trials,
ki is the correct key, otherwise it is wrong.
Fig. 3. key verification process for Eve with two consecutive CFB stages
Cˆi−1, Sˆi will be error free and all the errors in Cˆhi will be
caused by the possible errors in Cˆi. However, we can choose
τ such that with a high probability, the number of errors
in Cˆi does not exceed this threshold. Hence, the minimum
possible value for τ has to be adjusted such that at stage i,
the probability that the number of bit errors in Cˆi exceeds τ
becomes negligible. This probability is denoted by Pfault
Pfault = 1−
τ∑
i=0
(
64
i
)
(η)i(1− η)64−i. (2)
In the next step, we need to find the optimum value for Nc.
Suppose that Eve tries a key to see if it is the right one, and
let Kh0 be the hypothesis when the key is wrong and K
h
1 when
it is right. Then, we introduce random variable Ai such that
Ai = 1 defines successful trial at the ith stage that happens
when Hamming weight of Ei is less or equal to τ , and Ai = 0
otherwise. By proper selection of τ , We can make sure that
whenever there is no error in the input to the cipher, Eve can
recognize the right key. Hence, the probability of having a
successful event at the ith stage given the right key will be
P1 = Pr[Ai = 1|Kh1 ] = P [Cˆi−1is error-free] = (1− η)64.
(3)
All Nc tests will fail if in all of these trials, inputs to the
ciphers have error. If it happens when the key is right, Eve
will miss it, which has the probability of
Pm = (1− P1)Nc , (4)
We call Pm key missing probability. Thus, we need to find
minimum Nc such that keeps Pm below a threshold like Tm.
Now we need to compute the probability that Eve mistak-
enly admits a wrong key while examining a single candidate.
When the used key is wrong due to the avalanche effect, Cˆhi
will have bit error rate of α, that after Xor with Cˆi with bit
error probability of η, results in output bit error rate of γ as
γ = α(1− η) + η(1− α). (5)
Since to admit a wrong key at the ith stage as the right one,
HW of Ei must be less than τ , the probability of a successful
trial at this stage for a wrong key is
P2 = Pr[Ai = 1|Kh0 ] =
τ∑
i=0
(
64
i
)
γi(1− γ)64−i. (6)
On the other hand, Eve accepts a wrong key when there
happens at least one successful trial for it. Thus, the false key
probability for a single candidate is
PF = 1− (1− P2)Nc , (7)
where P2 is computed by Eq. (6). It may seem that PF is very
negligible for the case α = 0.5 in which γ = 0.5. However,
this probability can be aggregated over a large number of
examined wrong candidates in linear attack, and can lead to
an overall false key probability that can not be neglected, as
will be seen in simulation results.
B. Analysis of the Designed Attack Strategy for Eve
In [6] Yin et. al. showed that in noisy environment with bit
error rate of η, for linear attack on DES cipher, the probability
bias of the new linear equation denoted by εˆ, as well as the
success probability of attacker Ps can be computed based on
the linear probability bias of the original linear equation ε and
the number of obtained pairs by Eve N as
Ps = Φ(2
√
Nεˆ− Φ−1(1− 2−a−1)),
where εˆ = 2u+v(1− η − 0.5)u+vε. (8)
If adversary uses the improved linear analysis technique, she
needs to use Matsui’s linear equation for DES that requires u
bits of plaintext and v bits of corresponding ciphertext where
u + v = 26 to guess m = 26 key bits [22]. As discussed
in subsection II-B, in linear attack with bit advantage of a,
the total number of examined keys is 256−a. If the ciphertexts
that Eve obtains are error-free, her success probability will
be Ps which is the probability that the correct key is among
top 256−a examined candidates. However, when her obtained
ciphertexts are erroneous, it is still likely for her to obtain
the frame key. Also, it is possible that she gets no frame key
either right or wrong for decryption, which imposes her to
erase the whole frame. These events have probabilities that are
called total success probability and frame erasure probability,
respectively, that can be computed based on the following
theorem which is proven in appendix A.
Theorem 1: Consider a linear attack with bit advantage of
a. Assume Eve’s obtained ciphertexts contain bit errors with
the rate of η, and that she uses the designed strategy in brute-
force step of the linear attack. When Eve examines the right
key, she misses it with the probability of Pm given in Eq. (4),
and when the key is wrong, she may accept it wrongly with the
probability of PF given in Eq. (7). Let Ps, given in Eq. (8),
be the success probability when the ciphertexts are error-free.
Then, Eve’s total success probability can be computed by
Pc =
Ps(1− Pm)
PF 256−a
[1− (1− PF )256−a ] ≈ Ps(1− Pm), (9)
On the other hand, frame erasure probability will be
Pe = (1− Ps)(1− PF )256−a + PsPm(1− PF )(256−a−1)
≈ [1− 256−aPF ][1− (1− Pm)Ps]. (10)
5In addition, the probability that Eve accepts a wrong key in
linear attack which we call wrong key probability denoted by
Pw can be derived as Pw = 1− Pc − Pe.
Conclusively, we showed that there is possibility that Eve is
not able to obtain any key, or to falsely accept a wrong key.
C. Parameter Optimization of Adversary’s Attack Strategy
Eave’s objective is to mount a successful attack, and in order
to achieve this goal, she maximizes the success probability of
the utilized linear attack Pc, given in (9), knowing that her
computational ability is restricted, and there is a constraint
on the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs that she can ac-
cumulate. Namely, she can not perform more than θ DES
encryptions. In the linear cryptanalysis designed for noisy
environment, the number of all examined keys is 256−a and
each one has to be checked for Nc times. Hence, in the worst
scenario Eve has to run Nc256−a DES encryptions, which
due to Eve’s computational restrictions, should not exceed
θ. Moreover, we assume that before mounting attack on a
frame of data, Eve has already gathered as many number
of pairs as data storage capability and time limit allow her
denoted by Nmax. As a result, Eve needs to design attack
parameters including Nc, τ and a, to maximize the overall
success probability subject to the following constraint
max
Nc,τ,a
Pc subject to θ ≥ Nc.256−a, N ≤ Nmax. (11)
TABLE II
PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHM FOR ATTACK STRATEGY:
1- Initialization: put τ = 1, Nc = 1.
Determine Tm and Tf as thresholds for Pm and Pfault
also Ncmax as the maximum value for Nc.
2- τ ← τ + 1 until Pfault > Tf and τ < 64
if Pfault ≤ Tf or τ = 64 go to the next step
3- Nc ← Nc + 1 until Pm > Tm and Nc < Ncmax
if Pm ≤ Tm or Nc = Ncmax go to the next step
4- Compute a0 = d56− log2( θNc )e
5- Compute Pc for a0 ≤ a ≤ 56
choose a for which Pc has its largest value.
6- Output τ , Nc and a as attack parameters.
From Eq. (9) it can be concluded that Pc falls as Pm
increases. Since according to Eq. (4), Pm mainly depends
on Nc, we can define threshold Tm for it and find the
minimum number of trials Nc for which Pm remains below
Tm. According to equations (6) and (7), to decrease PF
we need to reduce τ as much as possible. If we define a
threshold Tf for Pfault, the minimum possible value for τ
according to our discussion in IV-A is the smallest τ for which
Pfault remains below Tf . Furthermore, Eve has to choose an
optimized value for a to have Pc maximized. The algorithm in
Table II, is designed to optimize the linear attack parameters
to let Eve achieve the maximum success rate Pc, for a given
η subject to her restrictions. In this algorithm, Pfault and Pm
can be computed using equations (2), (4), respectively.
V. MAIN AND WIRE-TAP CHANNEL MODELLING
In this section, we model main and wiretap channels in
block level (with 64-bit input and 64-bit output), using a
Fig. 4. CFB enciphering and deciphering with channel error
stationary finite state Markov chain (MC). Since Eve might
achieve the right frame key, get a wrong one or even get
nothing and drop the whole frame, we also need to model her
channel in frame level as a three state memoryless channel.
A. Main Channel Modelling Using MC
As it was described, the encrypted data goes through a
BSC channel with cross over probability of η, created by
intentionally introduced noise in application layer. We next
model the CFB cipher, channel with deliberate noise and
decipher altogether as a single channel, in order to analyze the
effect of intentional noise at the output of decipher. Note that
we assume there is no degradation in actual physical channel.
Fig. 4 illustrates the encryption and decryption structure of
CFB mode with DES cipher in the presence of introduced
noise to ciphertexts. As shown in this figure, {Ci} and
{Cˆi} are the sequences of transmitted 64-bit ciphertext and
received noisy ciphertext blocks, respectively, and {Pˆi} is the
sequence of decrypted blocks at time i for i = 1, 2, . . .. In
addition, {Zi} is the sequence of 64-bit blocks of intentional
bit errors in channel Zji that are independent and identically
distributed with Bernoulli distribution as Pr[Zji = 1] = η for
j = 1, . . . , 64, such that Cˆi = Ci ⊕ Zi. As Fig. 4 indicates
when Cˆi is noisy, it introduces errors with the rate of η to the
decryption output at time i, i.e. Pˆi. Moreover, since Cˆi−1 gets
encrypted with DES at time i, due to the avalanche effect, it
induces bit error rate of α in Pˆi. As a result, to characterize the
channel error state in decryption output at time i, it is required
to consider errors in both currently received ciphertext Cˆi and
the previous one Cˆi−1. Hence, we need to define four states.
Note that in a particular case when we consider α = 0.5,
we still need to define four states. In this case, when Cˆi−1 has
error, due to the fact that half of the ciphertext will be in error,
errors in Pˆi will be independent from Cˆi and consequently
from the error state at time i + 1. However, when it has no
error, errors in Cˆi will affect both decryption outputs at times
i and i + 1, and therefore the current state will depend on
the previous one. As a result, we have to take all four states
into account, each with a different transition probability from
the input plaintext block Pi denoted as 64-bit vector X to the
6output stored plaintext Pˆi denoted by 64-bit vector Y , and let
E = X ⊕ Y denotes the transition error vector.
The channel states are defined as: state S0, in which there
is no error from vector X to the vector Y and happens when
there is no error in Cˆi and Cˆi−1. State S1, which happens
when there is at least one bit error in Cˆi, but no error in DES
cipher input, Cˆi−1. State S2, which shows the situation in
which there is at least one bit error in Cˆi−1 without any error
in Cˆi. In this channel state, due to the avalanche effect, each
bit at the output of DES cipher, flips independently with the
probability of α causing bit error probability of α in Y . State
S3, in which both Cˆi and Cˆi−1 have at least one bit error.
For state S0 we have Pr[ej = 1|S0] = 0 and for S2,
Pr[ej = 1|S2] = α, where ej denotes the jth bit of E for
j = 1, . . . , 64. On the other hand, we should note that in
states S1 and S3, output bits can not be treated independently
because S1 and S3 are based on a given condition on the
whole 64-bit ciphertext Cˆi. Let q denote the probability that
there exists at least one bit error in Zi as
q = 1− (1− η)64. (12)
The next lemma gives the input-output transition probability
for states S1 and S3, which is proven in Appendix B.
Lemma 1: Let X be the input plaintext vector to the CFB
encryption mode and Y be the corresponding output of the
decryption. If the generated ciphertexts go through a channel
with cross over probability of η, we denote the Hamming
weight of the resulted error vector E with W (E). Then, for
state S1 the input-output vector transition probability will be
Pr(Y |X,S1) =
{
ηW (E)(1−η)64−W (E)
q W (E) 6= 0
0 W (E) = 0
(13)
where α is the avalanche bit error rate, and γ is given in Eq.
(5). The transition probability in state S3 for all W (E) is
Pr(Y |X,S3) = (14)
γW (E)(1− γ)64−W (E) − αW (E)(1− α)64−W (E)(1− q)
q
.
Next, we need to find state transition probabilities. For
instance, when the state at time i−1 was S2, apparently Cˆi−1
has been error free, so the only condition required to have
state S0 happen at time i is to receive error free Cˆi which has
the probability of 1− q that is the transition probability from
state S2 to S0. Similarly, we can compute other state transition
probabilities. Notably, since probability of occurrence of the
current state only depends on the previous state, Bob’s channel
can be modeled as a four state MC that is depicted in Fig. 5
with the following state transition probability matrix:
T =

1− q q 0 0
0 0 1− q q
1− q q 0 0
0 0 1− q q
 ,
whose elements demonstrate the transition probabilities be-
tween different states. Note that in each state, input plaintexts
undergo different channel conditions and error probabilities. In
fact, the main channel can only be modeled as a BSC channel
Fig. 5. Alice-Bob channel model as a four state MC
in states S0 and S2 with cross over probabilities of 0 and α
respectively, whereas in other two states it can be modeled
based on input-output transition probabilities in (13) and (14).
In particular, since in MC model for Alice-Bob channel,
all four states can be reached from one another, it is an
irreducible MC with positive recurrent states [23]. Then,
with a supposedly large frame size, MC can reach its stable
condition. Since all states are positive recurrent, the set of
equations PtT = Pt, and Pt.1 = 1 have a unique solution as
Pt = [p0, . . . , p3] where pk denotes the steady state probability
of state Sk for k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} [23]. Where 1 is a 4×1 vector
with all elements to be one, and P is steady state probability
vector (SSPV). By solving this equation set, we get
Pt =
[
(1− q)2 q(1− q) q(1− q) q2] . (15)
B. Wire-tap Channel Modelling
In section IV-B we showed that adversary can obtain the
right key of a frame with the probability of Pc by using
optimized verification strategy in linear attack. To consider the
worst possible case, we assume that before starting the attack,
Eve has gathered the required number of pairs such that for
each frame, she has already mounted her attack. When she
has been able to achieve the correct key, there will not be
any difference between the main channel and her channel, so
her decrypted data in that frame undergoes the same channel
condition as Bob’s. As shown in Fig. 6, we refer to this channel
state for Eve as the correct key state in frame level which
occurs with the probability of Pc and can be modeled as a
MC with four channel states in block level.
Nevertheless, with the probability of Pe, Eve will not be
able to get any key for the attacked frame and has to drop
the whole frame. We refer to this state as erasure state.
Moreover, Eve gets a wrong key with the probability of Pw,
such that after using a wrong key due to the avalanche effect
in DES cipher, each bit in DES output will be independently
flipped with the probability of α. This induced error Xors with
intentional i.i.d. channel noise that has bit error probability of
η. Consequently, in wrong key state, Eve’s channel can be
modeled as a BSC with cross over probability of γ given in
(5). Conclusively, wiretap channel is a degraded version of the
main channel that only in the correct key state can it be as
good as Bob’s channel. In fact, Eve’s channel behaves like a
pseudo two-dimensional Markov Chain (P2DMC) [24] with
three memoryless states in frame dimension, each acting like
another MC in block dimension as shown in Fig. 6.
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VI. SECRECY CAPACITY COMPUTATION
The next step is to quantify the secrecy capacity of the
analyzed security system. The capacity of finite state Markov
chains was calculated in [25] and [26]. In [27], [28] and [29]
the capacity of the finite state Markov chains with binary
symmetric channels associated in each state, was studied. In
[30] secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel modeled as a finite
state MC is computed. We assume that the channel states
are perfectly known to Bob and Eve, so what we compute
is mutual information between the input X and output Y
given the channel state, i.e. I(X;Y |Sl). Since all four states
of the main channel are in block level, in order to make Bob
aware of the channel states in each block, Alice can use an
error detection procedure and embed it in each block. For Eve,
we assume that she is aware of this error detection procedure
which allows her to beware of channel states in block level.
In frame level, it is assumed that she knows the correctness
state of each used frame key towards the end of each frame.
Specially, this can be considered as the best scenario for Eve,
providing us a lower bound for secrecy rate.
The main purpose of secrecy capacity computation is to
design a secrecy encoder which is applied ahead of the
encryption in application layer over multiple frames. Namely,
when the message is transmitted at a rate below the secrecy
rate to Bob using a Wyner-type encoding technique[31], [5],
we can have an arbitrarily small error probability for Bob as
well as the maximum entropy for Eve. In the asymptotic sense,
by secrecy encoding, users utilize Eve’s failures which cause
her channel to be a degraded channel compared to Bob’s.
A. Capacity of the Main Channel
When channel state information is available, the capacity
is the average of capacities that each one of these MC states
contribute to the overall channel capacity [25], [27]:
C =
K−1∑
k=0
pkC(Sk), (16)
where C(Sk) is the channel capacity in state Sk in bit per
channel use. It can be computed as the maximum information
rate between input and output vectors, X and Y , respectively,
assuming that the current state Sk is known to Bob:
C(Sk) = max
PX
I(X;Y |Sk)/64. (17)
Note that our modeled four state Markov channel is uniformly
symmetric because in any state, channel is output symmetric
[25]. For instance, in states S0 and S2, the channel behaves as
a BSC channel. In states S1 and S3, if we define the transition
probability matrix as Pij = Pr(Y = j|X = i, Sl) for i ∈
Y, i ∈ X , l = 1, 3, its rows and columns are permutations of
each other because according to equations (13) and (14), its
elements only depend on the HW difference of input-output
vectors. As a result, also in states S1 and S3, the channel
is output symmetric. In [25] it is shown that for uniformly
symmetric channel in which noise is independent of inputs,
like our modeled Markov channel, capacity can be achieved
with distribution which is uniform and iid. Accordingly, in this
finite state Markov channel by uniformly distributed inputs, the
mutual information will be essentially maximized.
In state S0, channel is an error-free BSC with capacity of 1,
i.e. C(S1) = 1, and in state S2, it acts like a BSC with cross
over probability of α and the capacity of C(S2) = 1− h(α),
where h is binary entropy function. However, for S1 and S3
in which decryption bit errors are not independent, we need
to compute the mutual information between input and output
vectors, namely I(X;Y |Sl) for l = 1, 3, that is
I(X;Y |Sl) = H(Y |Sl)−H(Y |X,Sl). (18)
We assume that channel state is perfectly known to Bob. In
the following theorem which is proven (in Appendix C) using
Lemma 1, we compute H(Y |X,Sl) for l = 1, 3.
Lemma 2: Consider our four state MC model for the main
channel with input vector X and output vector Y . with equally
likely input plaintexts, we can compute H(Y |X,S1) as
H(Y |X,S1) =−1
q
64∑
k=1
(
64
k
)
ηk(1− η)64−k
. log
[
ηk(1− η)64−k
q
]
. (19)
and H(Y |X,S3) will be
H(Y |X,S3) =
−1
q
64∑
k=0
(
64
k
)
.
[
γk(1− γ)64−k − αk(1− α)64−k(1− q)]
. log
[
γk(1− γ)64−k − αk(1− α)64−k(1− q)
q
]
. (20)
On the other hand, for both states S1 and S3, every output
vector Yj can be generated by introducing all possible error
vectors over their corresponding input vectors. Hence, since
all 64-bit input plaintexts are uniformly distributed, the output
will also be equally likely and uniformly distributed. Hence,
for l = 1, 3 the output entropy is H(Y |Sl) = 64. Thus, by
using Eq. (18) we can compute the mutual information for
states S1 and S3 as
I(X;Y |Sl) = 64−H(Y |X,Sl), for l = 1, 3, (21)
8where H(Y |S1, X) is given in Eq. (19), and H(Y |S3, X) in
Eq. (20). According to Eq. (17) the channel capacity in states
Sl for l = 1, 3 will be
C(Sl) =
I(X;Y |Sl)
64
(bits per channel use). (22)
where I(X;Y |S1) and I(X;Y |S3) are given in Eq. (21). We
can analyze Alice-Bob channel as a finite state MC with steady
state probabilities given in Eq. (15). Hence, according to Eq.
(16) Bob’s channel capacity CB as the average of the state
capacities can be computed as
CB = (1− q)2 + q(1− q)[C(S1) + 1− h(α)] + q2C(S3).
(23)
where α is the average bit error rate caused by the avalanche
effect. In addition, C(S1) and C(S3) are given in Eq. (22),
implying that these capacities mainly depend on q, γ, α and
η . As a result, the main channel capacity depends on q and γ
which according to Eq.’s (12) and (5) are themselves functions
of η, for a fixed α. Therefore, Bob’s channel capacity mainly
depends on the original channel cross over probability η.
B. Secrecy Capacity of the Wire-tap Channel with Noise
As discussed in subsection V-B, wiretap channel is a de-
graded version of the main channel that only in correct key
state can be as good as Bob’s channel. In the worst possible
scenario, we assume she is perfectly aware of channel states.
When Eve with the probability of Pc obtains the right key, her
channel capacity will be the same as Bob’s, i.e. CB , but when
with the probability of Pw gets a wrong key, her channel will
turn into a BSC with the cross over probability of γ, which
has the capacity of 1−h(γ). Note that, the erasure state does
not contribute to the capacity. Hence, Eve’s capacity will be
CE = Pw(1− h(γ)) + PcCB , (24)
where CB is given in Eq. (23). In the following theorem
secrecy capacity is found whose proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity for the created wire-tap
channel with the described channel models for Bob and Eve
will be
Cs = CB(1− Pc)− (1− Pe − Pc)(1− h(γ)). (25)
This result implies that secrecy capacity mainly depends on
Pc, Pe and CB . Due to the fact that all Pc, Pe and CB highly
depend on the channel error rate η, the main parameter that
impacts secrecy capacity of the system is intentional noise.
Namely, if Alice can control the cross over probability of the
channel, it is possible to adjust secrecy rate of the system.
Note that Alice applies secrecy encoding over multiple frames
in order to statistically average over Eve’s possible failures in
frame level, and also to enable Bob to do the error correction
coding when burst of errors occurs. Basically, Alice and Bob
has to use a well designed wiretap channel encoder, based
on the computed secrecy rate in Eq. (25). Notably, the main
issue in this scheme is delay that is imposed on the system
by applying multiple frame encoding that makes this scheme
applicable only for delay tolerant communication.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The main objective of numerical analysis is to evaluate the
effect of varying η on secrecy rate in order to see if there
exists an optimum value for η for which secrecy capacity
reaches its maximum. In simulations, we assume that Alice by
controlling η is able to generate a degraded wiretap channel. In
addition, we assume that the whole data is divided into equal
size frames, each containing as many number of 64-bit data
blocks as four-state MC reaches its steady state, such that for
each frame, encryption and decryption key remains constant.
Let us assume that θ = 248 is the maximum number of DES
encryptions that Eve can perform to establish an attack on each
frame. Because for instance, with a CPU having speed of 2.6
GHz, it takes for about 30 hours for her to accomplish these
many encryptions. For attack optimization algorithm proposed
in section IV-C, the initial values selected for n is n0 = 20,
maximum possible value for Nc is chosen Ncmax = 100,
and the thresholds Tf and Tm are set to 10−5. Furthermore,
we chose α as avalanche effect bit error rate to be 0.5. To
evaluate the effect of noise variation on the performance of
the system, we changed η from 10−4 to 0.05 with 500 steps
of size 10−4. Moreover, suppose that Eve is able to detect these
step size changes on η by probing the channel and each time
is able to optimize all attack parameters using the parameter
optimization algorithm. We assume that Eve is not allowed
to use more than Nmax = 246 number of pairs, and prior
to attack on each frame, she obtains the required number of
plaintext/ciphertext pairs and mounts her attack.
In Fig. 7, overall success probability, wrong key and frame
erasure probabilities are depicted as functions of η for fixed
number of pairs equal to 246. As this Figure displays with
rising η, Pc is monotonically decreasing, reaching zero for
η > 0.017, while wrong key probability Pw goes to 1 for
η = 0.05 because of increase in PF . As discussed in section
IV-A, the obtained results for Pw show that it becomes consid-
erable for some channel conditions and can not be ignored. In
Fig. 8 curves of main and wiretap channel capacities as well
as the secrecy capacity are drawn as functions of η. This Fig-
ure shows that Alice-Bob channel capacity is monotonically
decreasing with increase in η while secrecy capacity Cs rises
up to its maximum value 0.3442 for η = 0.0125 and then falls.
Indeed, this cross over probability can be considered optimum
value for which secrecy capacity achieves its maximum.
TABLE III
OPTIMIZED ATTACK PARAMETERS USING PROPOSED ALGORITHM IN IV-C
η 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.0125
Nc 5 9 16 20
τ 3 5 6 7
a 23 24 24 27
Pc 0.9999 0.9636 0.5014 0.1618
In Table III optimized attack parameters using our proposed
algorithm for four different η’s, i.e. 0.001, 0.005, 0.01 and
0.0125 are given. According to this table, with increase in η,
the required number of trials Nc for each key increases from
5 to 20 in order to keep Pm below the threshold Tm = 10−5
when it rises. The same holds for parameters a and τ which to
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Fig. 8. Main channel and Eve’s channel capacities and secrecy capacity for
varying channel cross over probability
achieve the determined thresholds, have to increase with rising
channel noise to maximize the overall success probability.
According to our numerical results, Alice can adjust channel
conditions by introducing deliberate noise in application layer
to have η = 0.0125, to achieve the desirable secrecy capacity.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed that by introducing tunable noise
in application layer upon the encrypted data, even though Eve
utilizes an optimized attack strategy, the secrecy rate of the
system can remarkably increase. In fact, Alice can achieve a
sufficiently large secrecy capacity by adjusting the cross over
probability of the channel using deliberate noise. This secrecy
rate guarantees a highly secure and reliable communication
using wiretap channel coding in application layer over multiple
frames. For secrecy capacity computation we tailored the
known channel states scenario. In our future work, we will
focus on the unknown state case and also will consider a more
generic cipher. In addition, we will work on more detailed
design of a secrecy encoder in this framework.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Suppose that all possible 256−a key candidates
are arranged as k1, k2, . . . , k256−a from the lowest rank to the
highest. Let Hi be the hypothesis that ki is the original key
and gi = 1 be the event that Eve decides that ki is correct.
We define a Bernoulli random variable B which is equal to 1
when the right key is among top top 256−a candidates, and 0,
otherwise. Thus, Pr[B = 0] = 1− Ps and Pr[B = 1] = Ps.
Let Pc be the total success probability for Eve. Note that when
B = 0, the right key will not be tested and consequently can
not be found. Therefore, we have
Pc =
256−a∑
i=1
Pr[gi = 1, Hi|B = 1].P r[B = 1]. (26)
The probability that Eve can realize the right key ki is
Pr[gi = 1, Hi|B = 1] = Pr[gi = 1|Hi, B = 1].P r[Hi|B = 1].
For Eve to be able to find the correct key at rank i, since
she starts the test from upper ranks to the lower ones, there
should not be any false key acceptance for ranks higher than
i, as well as a key missing event for rank i. Hence,
Pr[gi = 1|Hi, B = 1] = (1− PF )256−a−i(1− Pm). (27)
Moreover, Decisions about all 256−a keys are independent,
and all of the tested keys are equally probable to be the right
one, i.e. Pr[Hi|B = 1] = 1256−a . Therefore, by using Eq.’s
(26) and (27), we obtain Eq. (9) for total success probability.
The next step is to compute the frame erasure probability.
Assume that the right key is ki and is located among top 256−a
candidates. In order to obtain no key, Eve should not have any
false key admission for kj , j 6= i for i, j = 256 − 256−a +
1, . . . , 256, i.e. top 256−a candidates except the right key itself,
and in addition to that she has to miss the right key ki. When
ki is not among top candidates, since it will not be examined,
Eve gets nothing provided that there has been no wrong key
acceptance event for top 256−a tested candidates. As a result,
frame erasure probability can be computed according to Eq.
(10). By a similar technique, we can prove that the wrong key
probability is Pw = 1− Pe − Pc.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: We need to compute vector transition probabilities
between all possible input and output vectors X and Y for
states S1 and S3. Hence, for k = 1, 3
Pr[Y |X,Sk] = Pr[X ⊕ Y |X,Sk] = Pr[E|Sk], (28)
where E is the decryption error vector which is bit-wise Xor
of input and output vectors. The last equality is because E
depends on channel errors in previous and current ciphertexts,
so given the state, it is independent from input vector X . To
analyze states S0 and S1, we define two events, A and B as
A : There exists at least one bit error in Cˆi
B : There exists at least one bit error in Cˆi−1.
As a result, S1 = A ∩ B¯, and we can write
Pr(E|S1) =Pr(E|A, B¯) = Pr(E|B¯)Pr(A|E, B¯)
Pr(A|B¯) . (29)
The fact that events A and B are caused by two independent
channel error vectors Zi−1 and Zi implies that A is indepen-
dent of B and its complementary, i.e. Pr(A|B¯) = Pr(A) = q.
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When event B has not occurred, since only Cˆi can induce bit
errors with rate of η into the stored plaintext, the probability
that a particular decryption error vector E with Hamming
weight of W (E) takes place will be
Pr(E|B¯) = ηW (E)(1− η)64−W (E). (30)
In state S1, HW of error vector E can not be zero because
we know that the only source that can induce error at stage i
is Zi that surely has a non-zero bit. In this case, given an error
vector E with W (E) 6= 0 and knowing that event B did not
occur, we can infer that this error is induced by error in Cˆi,
hence event A has certainly occurred, i.e. Pr(A|E, B¯) = 1.
Thus, using equations (28), (29) and (30), we can obtain the
input-output transition probability in S1 as in Eq. (13).
On the other hand, according to its definition, state S3 takes
place when both events A and B happen, i.e. S3 = A ∩ B.
Therefore,
Pr(E|S3) = Pr(E|A,B) = Pr(E|B)Pr(A|E,B)
Pr(A|B) . (31)
Knowing that B occurred, implies that there exists one bit
error in DES input, which induces independent bit errors with
the rate of α in cipher output and consequently in Pˆi, but also
there is independent bit error sequence caused by Cˆi that has
the rate of η. Since the decryption error vector Ei is a result
of Xor of these two error sequences, we can say that Ei is a
sequence of random bits with i.i.d. distribution and bit error
probability of γ which is given in Eq. (5). As a result,
Pr(E|B) = γW (E)(1− γ)64−W (E), (32)
so we can write
Pr(A|E,B) = 1− Pr(A¯|E,B) = 1− Pr(E|A¯, B)Pr(A¯|B)
Pr(E|B) .
(33)
When A has not occurred, But B has, the only error source
will be the cipher input that induces independent bit errors
with the rate of α into the output. Consequently, we have
Pr(E|A¯, B) = αW (E)(1− α)64−W (E). (34)
Then, using equation (32), (33) and (34) gives us
Pr(A|E,B) = 1− α
W (E)(1− α)64−W (E)(1− q)
γW (E)(1− γ)64−W (E) . (35)
Finally, according to equations (28), (31) and (35) the input-
output transition probability in state S3 for all W (E) can be
obtained using Eq. (14).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof: If we assume that all 264 possible input plaintexts
are equally likely, for l = 1, 3 we can write
H(Y |Sl, X) =−
∑
i
∑
j
1
264
Pr(Y = Yj |X = Xi, Sl) (36)
. logPr(Y = Yj |X = Xi, Sl)
=−
264∑
j=1
Pr(E = Ej |Sl) logPr(E = Ej |Sl).
The second equality is resulted from Eq. (28) for Ei,j = Xi⊕
Yj as the decryption error vector. Furthermore, for state S1
as discussed in subsection V-A, Hamming weight of the error
vector E can not be zero. Thus, we can take E1 as a 64-bit
zero vector and exclude it from this summation. Then, using
Eq. (13) brings about the following result
H(Y |S1, X) =−1
q
264∑
j=2
ηW (Ej)(1− η)64−W (Ej)
. log
[
ηW (Ej)(1− η)64−W (Ej)
q
]
. (37)
We know that out of all 264 error vectors, the number of
possible vectors with Hamming weight of W or vectors with
W non-zero bits is the number of possibilities of choosing W
bits out of 64 bits which is equal to W -combinations from 64
elements. Finally, Eq. (37) can be rewritten as Eq. (19). Note
that we excluded zero weight case, i.e. k = 0.
For state S3, we can compute H(Y |S3, X) using Eq. (36)
for l = 3. In this case, j = 1 is not excluded because unlike
state S1 in state S3, it is possible to have decryption error
vector E1 with zero weight. Finally, by using Eq. (14) similar
to the entropy in S1, we obtain H(Y |S3, X) in Eq. (20).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: It is shown in [32] that when the mutual informa-
tion between Alice at Bob and the mutual information between
Alice and Eve are individually maximized by the the same
input distribution, and the main channel is less noisy that the
wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity can be computed as the
difference of two capacities. In our channel model, since both
Bob and Eve’s mutual information with Alice are maximized
with uniformly distributed inputs X , and wiretap channel is
noisier that the main channel, the secrecy capacity will be,
Cs = CB − CE . It gives us the final result in Eq. (25).
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